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Abstract
A new promising account of human brain function suggests that sensory cor-
tices try to optimise information processing via predictions that are based
on prior experiences. The brain is thus likened to a probabilistic prediction
machine. There has been a growing – though inconsistent – literature to sug-
gest that features of autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) are associated with a
deficit in modelling the world through such prediction-based inference. How-
ever empirical evidence for differences in low-level sensorimotor predictions
in autism is still lacking. One approach to examining predictive processing
in the sensorimotor domain is in the context of self-generated (predictable)
as opposed to externally-generated (less predictable) effects. We employed
two complementary tasks - force-matching and intentional binding - which
examine self- versus externally-generated action effects in terms of sensory
attenuation and attentional binding respectively in adults with and without
autism. The results show that autism was associated with normal levels of
sensory attenuation of internally-generated force and with unaltered tempo-
ral attraction of voluntary actions and their outcomes. Thus, our results do
not support a general deficit in predictive processing in autism.
1. Introduction
The predictive processing framework accounts for how we deal optimally1
with ambiguous signals from our environment using prediction-based opti-2
misation of inference (Teufel and Fletcher [1], Friston and Kiebel [2]). While3
initially developed as a framework to understand healthy brain function,4
this account also offers potential insights into the processes underlying psy-5
chiatric disorders (Moore [3], Adams et al. [4], Barrett et al. [5], Sterzer et al.6
[6], Gadsby and Hohwy [7], Teufel and Fletcher [8], Corlett and Fletcher7
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[9], Friston et al. [10], Kube et al. [11, 12], Fineberg et al. [13]). There has8
been a growing interest in applying this framework to investigate differences9
in the cognitive, perceptual and neural processes in autism spectrum condi-10
tions (Qian and Lipkin [14], Pellicano and Burr [15], Sinha et al. [16], Lawson11
et al. [17], Van de Cruys et al. [18], Rosenberg et al. [19], van Boxtel and12
Lu [20]). Much interest has been sparked by a proposal from Pellicano and13
Burr [15] suggesting that predictive deficits in individuals with autism are14
due to a diminished effect of prior expectations on the processing of am-15
biguous sensory information, leading to inferences that are more strongly16
based on sensory information. This atypicality in information processing,17
they speculate, could be a consequence of excessive endogenous neural noise18
although others have pointed out that reduced endogenous noise could yield19
comparable outcomes (Brock [21]). Alternative accounts suggest that the20
problem lies not in the prior expectations themselves but in altered precision21
of the prediction error - a key feedforward signal in the processing hierarchy22
(Van de Cruys et al. [22], Lawson et al. [17]).23
Prima facie, the framework contributes a lot to understanding the char-24
acteristic clinical features of autism. For instance, it seems plausible to con-25
jecture that deficits with the generation of predictions are at the core of26
difficulties with adapting to change, intolerance of uncertainty and certain27
sensory atypicalities in individuals with autism. Empirically, the evidence for28
these theories is still sparse and the idea of a global “predictive impairment29
[...] shared across individuals” (Sinha et al. [16]) seems to be contradicted30
by an absence of apparent deficits in motion prediction of objects (Tewolde31
et al. [23]), predictions about the weight of objects based on material cues32
(Arthur et al. [24]) and other cognitive processes supposed to tap into predic-33
tive abilities (Croydon et al. [25], Manning et al. [26], Cruys et al. [27], Maule34
et al. [28]). Where group differences have been found, they mostly pertain35
to predictive deficits in the social domain: Balsters et al. [29], Chambon36
et al. [30], Turi et al. [31], Amoruso et al. [32], von der Lu¨he et al. [33], but37
this is not universally true, as Pell and colleagues have found no deficits in38
prediction-based perception of other people’s gaze direction (Pell et al. [34]).39
It is also unclear whether the observed deficits in prediction are due to low-40
level atypicalities in the predictive architecture or whether they might be41
the result of differences in other areas that prediction taps into such as the42
learning of action-outcome contingencies (Schuwerk et al. [35]) and temporal43
processing (Brodeur et al. [36], Szelag et al. [37]).44
In short, while a predictive processing deficit provides a credible explana-45
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tory model for features of autism, the experimental evidence is currently46
inconsistent and requires clarification. Moreover, all of the paradigms men-47
tioned above tap into higher-order perceptual and cognitive functions. In48
order to support the idea of a global prediction deficit in autism, how-49
ever, a characterisation of basic mechanisms of sensory and motor prediction50
are currently lacking. These basic predictive mechanisms initially laid the51
foundations for the predictive processing framework (Holst and Mittelstaedt52
[38], Helmholtz [39]) but, surprisingly, have not been studied in ASD. In the53
current study we therefore used two complementary tasks known to index54
predictive processing in basic sensory and motor function: the forcematch-55
ing task (Shergill et al. [40]) and a modified version of the intentional binding56
paradigm (Moore and Haggard [41]). We chose these tasks for two reasons:57
Firstly, in contrast to the higher-order cognitive paradigms mentioned above,58
both experiments focus on basic mechanisms of sensory and motor predic-59
tion that laid the foundations for the predictive processing framework ([38]).60
Secondly the tasks have robustly and reliably elicited responses in line with61
current views on prediction in healthy individuals and have, moreover, es-62
tablished the presence of altered responses in populations whose predictive63
architecture is conjectured to be compromised (Shergill et al. [42], Voss et al.64
[43], Synofzik et al. [44]).65
The forcematching task measures attenuation of the sensory consequences66
of self-generated actions. It is based on the principle of motor control theory67
which suggests that sensory consequences of predictable forces are anticipated68
and attenuated. Tasks exploring this phenomenon have reliably demon-69
strated that self-generated sensory consequences are perceived as weaker70
than externally-generated sensory consequences of the same intensity across71
a range of experimental paradigms, volunteers and laboratories (Wolpe et al.72
[45, 46], Shergill et al. [40, 42], Voss et al. [47], Teufel et al. [48], Walsh et al.73
[49], Therrien et al. [50], Paree´s et al. [51]).74
The intentional binding (IB) effect refers to the finding that self-generated,75
voluntary actions and their sensory consequences are perceived to be closer76
together in time than movements externally forced upon the person and their77
sensory outcomes (Haggard et al. [52], Prinz and Hommel [53]). IB is thought78
to be an implicit measure of sense of agency (SoA) which in contrast to the79
sensory attenuation observed in the forcematching task, is speculated to rely80
both on predictive mechanisms as well as post-hoc inferences. Predictive81
and postdictive contributions to agency have been investigated by varying82
the probability with which the voluntary action produces the sensory out-83
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come (Moore and Haggard [41]). Moore and Haggard found that both pro-84
cesses operate, but that one dominates depending on the specific outcome85
probabilities: On trials, on which the action produced an outcome with a86
high probability, healthy volunteers exhibited temporal binding even in the87
absence of the outcome, whereas subjective temporal compression was only88
observed on those low “outcome probability” trials that did indeed produce89
the outcome.90
Thus, these two complementary tasks are well-suited to exploring different91
aspects of the predictive processing model of ASC: While the forcematching92
task is more likely to tap into basic predictive mechanisms of sensory gat-93
ing (Chapman and Beauchamp [54], Hughes et al. [55]), intentional binding94
is thought to be largely attributable to temporal control and prediction (of95
the timing of the outcome). Therefore unimpaired performance on one, but96
not the other task would yield additional insight as to whether differences in97
predictive abilities in autism are more likely due to primary sensory deficits98
or more general issues with the timing and learning of action-outcome con-99
tingencies.100
2. Experiment 1 - Forcematching in Autism101
2.1. Method102
2.1.1. Participants103
27 volunteers with a clinical diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder and104
26 healthy control participants (with no history of neurological or psychiatric105
illness) took part in the study. Written informed consent was obtained from106
all participants. Cognitive function for all study volunteers was assessed using107
the timed version of the Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM)108
(Raven et al. [56]) and the Wechsler FSIQ in the case of one ASC volunteer.109
Furthermore all participants filled in the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory110
[57] as handedness can have an effect on force-perception and production111
(Park et al. [58], Gertz et al. [59]). On the inventory, a score of +40 reflects112
right-handedness and a score below -40 left-handedness.113
3 ASC participants were excluded from the subsequent analysis as two114
had a diagnosis of schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder and one was115
unable to complete the experiment due to difficulties with maintaining the116
required arm posture. Aside from psychotic disorders no other psychiatric117
conditions served as exclusion criteria as anxiety, depression, OCD and other118
neurodevelopmental disorders such as ADHD and dyspraxia are thought to119
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Table 1: Participant Demographics
Group Age (SD) Sex (m:f) Handedness (SD) IQ (SD)
ASC (N=24) 30.1 (9.2) 11:13 53.8 (44.5) 105.2 (12.5)
Controls (N=26) 30.6 (6.0) 9:17 75.3 (19.2) 106.8 (11.6)
be extremely common/co-morbid in ASC (for prevalence estimates see Leyfer120
et al. [60], Eaves and Ho [61], White et al. [62]). 10 of the participants with121
autism had co-morbid diagnoses of depression and/or anxiety and 6 were122
currently taking SSRIs. A further two people had a diagnosis of ADHD (one123
on medication) and one had unmedicated OCD.124
Participants were well-matched for age, IQ (IQ information was unavail-125
able for one control participant) and gender but the groups differed on the126
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory with three left-handed volunteers in the127
ASC group and none in the controls (see Table 1).128
All but 3 of the ASC participants were assessed with module 4 of the129
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS, [63]) and while the group130
was moderately symptomatic (mean score: 6.7), only 9 participants met131
cut-off criteria for an autism spectrum condition and none met diagnostic132
criteria for autism. Low sensitivity of the ADOS module 4 has previously133
been reported and attributed to compensatory behaviour and “milder ASDs”134
([64]). Even among children, those with a diagnosis of an autism spectrum135
condition that is not “childhood autism” (ICD-10) often do not meet the136
diagnostic cut-off for the ADOS (Baird et al. [65]).137
Given previous reports of altered forcematching in individuals with high138
levels of schizotypy (Teufel et al. [48]), we used the 21-item Peters Delusion139
Inventory (PDI, Peters and Garety [66]) to quantify schizotypal traits in all140
participants. The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al. [67]),141
a 50-item self-administered questionnaire, was used as a measure of autistic142
traits. AQ and PDI scores were unavailable for one ASC participant.143
2.1.2. Experimental Procedure144
The experiment was modelled on the design by Shergill et al. [40] in which145
a lever – via a torque motor - exerts mild pressure onto the participants’ left146
index finger. Depending on the condition, participants were asked to match147
the experienced pressure to the point of subjective equality (i.e. the point148
where the pressure felt the same) by either pressing directly on the lever149
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with their right index finger (“finger condition”) or by adjusting a slider150
which controlled the torque motor (“slider condition”), see Figure 1.151
Figure 1: Illustration of the forcematching paradigm in which participants are asked to
match a force applied to their left index finger via a lever. Participants had to reproduce
the experienced force either by pushing down on the lever with their other index finger
(A) or by moving a slider (B).
As a result of forward prediction models for self-generated movements,152
participants routinely exceed the target force in the “finger” condition due to153
sensory attenuation, whereas predictions for the indirect control of the lever154
via the slider are less precise and participants thus tend to be more accurate155
in their reproduction of the force.156
The slider was a potentiometer which transduced a force gain at the ra-157
tio of 0.5 N/cm. The target force was presented for 2.5 seconds (ramped158
up and down linearly over 0.25 seconds) after which an auditory go-signal159
indicated that participants should make their response to ensure that the160
matching took place within 2 seconds of the target force being withdrawn.161
After 3 seconds a second auditory signal indicated the end of each trial and162
instructed participants to lift their right index finger from the lever or move163
the slider back to the starting position. Mean force production was mea-164
sured between 2 and 2.5 seconds after the start of the matching period, as in165
previous studies (Voss et al. [47]). Within each condition 10 different force166
magnitudes between 0.5N and 2.75N, differing in steps of 0.25N were applied167
in randomised order. Each force magnitude was presented for a total of 8168
trials. Subjects first completed a 5-trial practice session for both conditions169
to ensure that they understood the task and were able to respond within the170
required time window. They then completed one “finger” and one “slider”171
block with 80 trials (160 trials in total). Invalid trials due to too slow or172
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fast responses were repeated until a total of 80 valid trials had been com-173
pleted. Practice sessions and test blocks were counterbalanced across both174
experimental groups.175
2.1.3. Data Analysis176
One ASC participant was excluded from further analysis as their perfor-177
mance in the “finger” condition was more than 9 standard deviations above178
the mean.179
Basic force attenuation was indexed by calculating an overcompensation180
score based on the difference between the matched forces in the “finger” and181
“slider” condition (each normalised against the passively experienced force)182
for each force level (see Humpston et al. [68]). Individual regression lines of183
target force versus matched force for each subject were fitted for the “finger”184
and “slider” condition and then summarised as group regressions for both185
conditions. In addition to the basic overcompensation score, the slope and186
intercept of the regression lines can provide more detailed information about187
the matching performance of different groups (Wolpe et al. [45]).188
Group differences were evaluated with Bayesian estimation using Markov189
Chain Monte Carlo methods to generate samples of the relevant posterior dis-190
tributions. JAGS (Plummer [69]) was implemented to build a Gibbs sampler191
and the default non-informative priors of the R package BEST (Kruschke192
[70]) were implemented. The data is assumed to follow a t-distribution in193
BEST with ν (1-∞) degrees of freedom controlling the width of the tails194
and thus acting as a measure of normality. The wide priors make the esti-195
mation of the posterior parameters (mean(s) µ, standard deviation(s) σ and196
the shared normality parameter ν) very data driven. Convergence was as-197
sumed as long as the Brooks-Gelman-Rubin scale reduction factor (Gelman198
and Rubin [71], Brooks and Gelman [72]) was <1.1. Bayesian correlations199
were calculated using the BayesianFirstAid package in R.200
3. Results201
Both groups showed the characteristic force attenuation with the poste-202
rior estimates of the mean overcompensation scores being 0.73 (credible in-203
terval/CI: [0.51, 1.00], estimated effect size: 1.58) and 0.80 (CI: [0.52, 1.10],204
estimated effect size: 1.33) for the control and autism group respectively.205
Handedness was unlikely to be associated with the magnitude of sensory at-206
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tenuation (as measured by the overcompensation score) with an estimated207
correlation of r=-0.16 and a 95% CI of [-0.45, 0.16].208
Plotting the mean linear regressions for matched forces in the “finger”209
and “slider” conditions did not suggest any group differences (Figure 2a).210
Congruously, Bayesian estimation yielded little evidence for a group differ-211
ence on the means of overcompensation scores (estimated difference of means:212
-0.03, CI: [-0.37, 0.31], estimated effect size: -0.08, Figure 2b) or intercept213
(estimated difference of means: -0.04, CI: [-0.39, 031], estimated effect size:214
-0.09, Figure 2c) of the “finger” condition.215
Figure 2: Main results for the forcematching task. (A) Mean linear regressions for
the matched forces in the “finger” and “slider” conditions. Jitter was added to prevent
overplotting. Error bars represent ±1 standard error (SE) of the mean. Perfect matching
performance is indicated by the dashed black line. (B) A plot of the posterior probability
of the difference in means for the overcompensation score (black) with the estimated
population means in yellow and purple respectively. The shaded area is the credible
interval (CI), in this case the 95% Highest Density Interval (HDI) (C) Posterior probability
of the difference in means for the intercept in the “finger” condition.
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For a more in-depth view at these measures see Appendix A.216
3.0.1. Relationship between the Questionnaire Measures and Sensory Atten-217
uation218
As expected, posterior estimates for group means on the AQ indicated219
a difference (estimated difference of means: -19.49, CI: [-24.03, -15.06], es-220
timated effect size: -2.62) and perhaps more surprisingly there was also ev-221
idence in favour of the true difference in means on the PDI being non-zero222
(estimated difference of means: -21.50, CI: [-42.22, -0.58], estimated effect223
size: -0.65) (Figure 3a).224
Figure 3: Results for the Questionnaire measures. (A) Plot showing the distribution of
the questionnaire scores for both groups, including the median and interquartile ranges.
(B) The correlation between sensory attenuation (as measured by the intercept in the
“finger” condition) and the PDI. (C) The correlation between sensory attenuation (as
measured by the intercept in the “finger” condition) and the AQ.
Using the intercept in the internal condition as the main measure of sen-225
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sory attenuation (see: Wolpe et al. [45]), in line with previous observations226
(Teufel et al. [48]; but see: Humpston et al. [68]), we found that the proba-227
bility that sensory attenuation has a negative relationship with schizotypy in228
the control group (probability: 98%, estimated correlation: -0.41, CI: [-0.73,229
-0.07]), whereas evidence in the ASC group suggested no significant relation-230
ship (estimated correlation: 0.04, CI: [-0.40, 0.45]). Conversely there did not231
seem to be an association between self-reported autistic traits on the AQ232
and sensory attenuation in the control group (estimated correlation: -0.01,233
CI: [0.42, 0.40]), but a trend for a positive relationship in the ASC group234
(estimated correlation: 0.36, CI:[-0.03, 0.70]), see Figure 3b and 3c.235
3.0.2. Summary236
Overall, we found no evidence of a deficit in the attenuation of self-237
produced sensory consequences in autism, which is in contradiction of ex-238
isting predictive processing models of the condition. A Bayesian analysis239
supported an absence of group differences in key measures of sensory atten-240
uation. Interestingly, not only AQ (as predicted) but also a measure related241
to schizotypy (PDI) was higher in the ASC group. Moreover, in line with242
previous work, correlative analyses of sensory attenuation with schizotypy243
showed an expected negative relationship in control participants. No such244
correlation was found in ASC. Conversely, AQ scores in the autism group245
correlated positively with sensory attenuation.246
4. Experiment 2 - Intentional Binding in Autism247
4.1. Method248
4.1.1. Participants249
A total of 50 participants (25 per group) were recruited for the study.250
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. All but one of251
the ASC volunteers also took part in experiment 1 and thus the same two252
volunteers with a history of psychosis were excluded.253
Participants were matched for age, IQ (IQ information was unavailable254
for two control participants) and gender (see Table 2).255
4.1.2. Experimental Procedure256
The basic structure of the task was similar to other intentional binding257
experiments (Haggard et al. [52]): Participants were instructed to press a key258
with their right index finger at a time of their own choosing which caused259
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Table 2: Participant Demographics for the Intentional Binding Task
Group Age (SD) Sex (m:f) IQ (SD)
ASC (N=23) 29.0 (6.1) 11:12 105.2 (12.7)
Controls (N=25) 31.2 (5.7) 10:15 104.6 (10.6)
a tone 250ms later. While they were engaged in this task, a Libet clock260
(Libet et al. [73]) was visible in the middle of the screen with a clock-hand261
rotating at a rate of 2560ms per revolution. After the keypress, the clock-262
hand continued to rotate for a random amount of time. Participants were263
told to avoid pressing at “premeditated” clock positions.264
In the “action block” condition, participants had to recall the time at265
which they pressed the key (i.e. recall where the clock-hand was pointing266
to when they performed the keypress) while in “tone blocks” participants267
were asked to enter the the clock-hand’s position when they heard the tone.268
As in Moore’s adapted version (Moore and Haggard [41]), the probability of269
the tone occurring was manipulated: In half of the blocks (2 per condition)270
the tone followed the key press 50% of the time while in the other half it271
happened 75% of the time (see Figure 4). When no tone occurred, partici-272
pants were asked to report a dummy value. Participants were informed of the273
response requirement (time estimation of the key press or tone occurrence)274
immediately prior to the blocks which otherwise did not differ visually from275
each other. The order of blocks was randomised for each participant.276
In addition to 8 experimental blocks (4 per condition), the volunteers277
also completed a baseline task requiring them to judge the time of their key278
presses without any subsequent tone.279
Blocks with the 50% probability for tone occurrence had 50 trials whereas280
blocks with tones occurring 75% of the time had 40 trials. Baseline blocks had281
50 trials. Due to a technical error 2 control subjects had the trial numbers282
reversed and 3 controls and 7 ASC participants only completed 40 trials in283
the baseline task.284
The data from one of the control participants was excluded prior to the285
analysis as it became clear in the debriefing that he had not been following286
the instructions.287
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Figure 4: An illustration of the experimental procedure for IB with varying outcome
contingencies
4.1.3. Data Analysis288
The analysis followed the typical protocol for IB studies. Initially, re-289
sponses were corrected against the mean of all baseline trials for each partic-290
ipant. For the purposes of the analysis, the first 10 trials of each block were291
not included as participants had to learn the contingencies. The reported292
shifts in the performed key presses were used as the measure of intentional293
binding. By convention, binding for actions is indicated by a positive differ-294
ence.295
Based on Voss et al. [43], the predictive component to the intentional296
binding effect was calculated as the difference in overall shift between action297
only trials in the high probability blocks and action only trials in the low298
probability blocks (“action only” trials (75%) – “action only” (50%)). Since299
the tone is observed in neither condition, any difference in the strength of300
binding must be due to the higher predictive power of the “action only” 75%301
probability blocks. Analogously the inferential contribution was defined as302
the average shift in “tone only” trials in the 50% blocks. The authors describe303
the 50% contingency as subjectively “random”, so participants should not be304
able to form helpful predictions. Therefore any binding effect must be due to305
an inferential component that acts on the temporal estimation process after306
the tone occurs.307
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5. Results308
5.0.1. Basic Intentional Binding Effect309
The resulting pattern resembled Moore and Haggard’s [41] results where310
intentional binding was observed in all conditions apart from the low-probability311
no-tone trials (see Figure 5).312
Figure 5: Baseline-corrected shift in the action estimates (ms) for each probability block
in the “action only” and “tone only” conditions. Error bars represent ±1 standard error
(SE) of the mean.
5.0.2. Group Comparison on Predictive and Inferential Components of In-313
tentional Binding314
The Bayesian estimation of the group difference for the predictive compo-315
nent (estimated difference of means: -13.7, CI: [-65.1, 37.9], estimated effect316
size: -0.17, Figure 6a) and the inferential component (estimated difference of317
means: -8.49, CI: [-59, 42.5], estimated effect size: -0.11, Figure 6b) makes a318
difference unlikely for both parameters.319
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Figure 6: Posterior distributions for the difference in estimated population means of the
predictive (A) and inferential (B) component of IB. The shaded area is the 95% Highest
Density Interval (HDI).
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5.0.3. Relationship between the Questionnaire Measures and Intentional Bind-320
ing321
There was little evidence that the AQ or PDI correlated with any of the322
measures; estimated correlations ranged between -0.22 and 0.23 and all CIs323
included 0.324
5.0.4. Summary325
Overall, therefore, in keeping with the findings from the force-matching326
task in experiment 1, we found no group difference in intentional binding.327
Both groups showed expected reductions in the subjective experience of328
action-outcome timing in both the predictive (tone absent) and postdictive329
(tone present) conditions.330
6. Discussion331
In the past decade, a number of prominent hypotheses have suggested332
that autism is primarily a disorder of atypical predictive processes and that333
the range of alterations, particularly in perceptual experiences can be ex-334
plained in terms of these atypicalities. However the empirical evidence sup-335
porting these hypotheses in the form of differences in low-level sensorimotor336
prediction has been lacking which led us to investigate sensory attenuation337
and agency-based temporal binding in adults with autism. In light of this338
theoretical work conceptualising autism as a “disorder of prediction”(Sinha339
et al. [16]), one would expect to find reduced perceptual attenuation in the340
autistic group and a reduction of the predictive component to the intentional341
binding effect. Neither of these observations were made and our experiments342
do not support the idea of a deficit in predictive processing in autism. Both343
ASC and control groups demonstrated sensory attenuation of self-generated344
stimuli with a magnitude consistent with previously reported results (Teufel345
et al. [48], Shergill et al. [40], Wolpe et al. [45]) and both groups exhibited346
the basic pattern of inferential and predictive binding reported by Moore347
and Haggard [41]. These findings indicate that global deficits in predictive348
processing cannot explain the observed cognitive, perceptual and motor dif-349
ferences in autism spectrum conditions.350
However, one interesting group difference that emerged lay in the within-351
group relationship between odd or unusual beliefs, as measured by PDI and352
the magnitude of sensory attenuation. While we replicated the previous353
finding that an increase in the number of delusion-like beliefs was associated354
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with more accurate force-matching (i.e. reduced sensory attenuation), this355
relationship was not seen in autism. However there was some preliminary ev-356
idence that higher autistic traits in autistic individuals could be related to an357
increase in sensorimotor prediction as indicated by increased sensory atten-358
uation. The lack of correlation between attenuation and PDI in the autism359
group is intriguing. One possibility is that the PDI and AQ questionnaires360
do not measure the same underlying traits in autism as in controls (Murray361
et al. [74]). An alternative explanation would be that sensory attenuation362
is indeed modulated by different latent traits in autistic and non-autistic363
individuals.364
Compared to the schizophrenia literature, evidence for disruptions of sen-365
sory gating and agency processing in autism is scant: Previous research on366
sensory attenuation in ASC has reported unimpaired cancellation of self-367
generated tactile stimulation in the form of self-tickling (Blakemore et al.368
[75]) and adults with autism are just as good as their matched controls at369
judging agency based on whether visual feedback matched their own hand370
movements or not (David et al. [76]). In contrast, Zalla et al. [77] showed a371
decreased use of sensorimotor cues in making judgments of agency in adults372
with autism which was correlated with performance on a Theory of Mind373
task. They conclude that autistic individuals experience their internal sig-374
nals as unreliable and might rely more on retrospective external cues (such375
as accuracy) to evaluate agency. Preliminary studies on interoceptive deficits376
in autism seem to support this claim (Noel et al. [78], Garfinkel et al. [79]).377
Similarly, Zalla and Sperduti [80] suggest that autism is characterised by378
an isolated impairment of predictive (but not postdictive) processes in the379
genesis of sense of agency. A recent study has indeed found an attenuated380
intentional binding effect in adults with autism when tested with visual, au-381
ditory and audio-visual action outcomes (Sperduti et al. [81]). In light of our382
diverging results the differences between the two experiments need to be ex-383
amined: The manipulation of the probability of the action effect occurring in384
the experiment that is presented here is unlikely to cause an enhancement in385
overall IB, as it should introduce more uncertainty and more spurious bind-386
ing effects. An obvious suggestion, given that Sperduti et al. employed three387
different delays between the action and action outcome, is that time estima-388
tion and temporal binding difficulties which are common in autism (Brock389
et al. [82], Maister and Plaisted-Grant [83]), impeded performance for the390
ASC group. As Maister and Plaisted-Grant [83] point out, impairments in391
estimating short time intervals between 0.5 and 2 seconds seem to be the392
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result of deficits in attentional control in autistic individuals, rather than393
indicative of a more global temporal processing deficit and thus might elude394
being captured by the proportion error scores used in Sperduti et al. [81].395
Other differences between the two studies include the smaller (N=15 for the396
autism group) all-male participant panel in Sperduti et al.’s experiment, the397
different estimation methods (Libet clock vs. analogue scale) and the fact398
that each condition (interval and modality) was only presented 10 times with399
180 trials in total by Sperduti et al. compared to ∼460 trials in the current400
study. If autistic individuals are indeed more variable in their responses due401
to attentional deficits, a higher number of trials would be needed to obtain402
the expected effect.403
The lack of phenotyping for sensory reactivity and abnormalities is cer-404
tainly a caveat of the present study and could be addressed more thoroughly405
in future investigations. Detailed assessments of sensory subtypes could also406
help to explain the commonly observed heterogeneity in task performance407
seen in the autistic group (Lane Alison E. et al. [84]) and it is possible that408
differences in predictive abilities might be domain-specific. As predictive409
attenuation is not unique to the tactile domain (Benazet et al. [85], Cardoso-410
Leite et al. [86], Desantis et al. [87], Hughes and Waszak [88]), an investiga-411
tion linking domain-specific sensory reactivity (like the frequently reported412
auditory defensiveness) to sensory attenuation might be better equipped to413
uncover potential differences. Furthermore, although it is sometimes claimed414
that these sensorimotor processes are well understood given the extensive re-415
search into central and peripheral nervous system mechanisms supporting416
sensory gating (Rushton et al. [89]), their relationship with the perceptual417
attenuative processes seen in the force matching task is not entirely clear418
and there is some evidence that the two processes are functionally distinct419
(Palmer et al. [90]).420
A further limitation of the experiments presented here was the exclusion421
of younger populations for the experiments. As autism is a neurodevelop-422
mental disorder, it would be worth exploring if the trajectories for acquiring423
and refining internal models of the external world are different in autistic424
individuals even if performance is indistinguishable at a later developmen-425
tal stage. Since structural priors are likely to either emerge from long-term426
aggregation of individual experiences or as embedded constraints acting on427
bottom-up processes (Teufel and Fletcher [1]) - as opposed to the short-term428
learning of stochastic relationships for contextual priors - they supposedly are429
subject to developmental processes. As such the force-matching task would430
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be the best candidate for a developmental approach to predictive coding431
paradigms.432
Our study aimed to explore the predictive abilities of individuals with433
autism in two motor tasks that are thought to be subserved by partially434
overlapping, but different neural mechanisms. Previous efforts to investigate435
predictive processing in autism have yielded inconclusive results (mostly sup-436
porting aberrant prediction in the social domain), despite a comparatively437
large theoretical literature. Our present study militates against the the idea438
of a general prediction deficit in autism as results indicate intact predictive439
and postdictive mechanisms of sensory attenuation and temporal attraction440
between actions and action outcomes. However results hinted at more sub-441
tle differences in the relationships between latent traits of schizotypy/autism442
and task performance in the two groups which illustrates the need to consider443
potential discrepancies in specific domains or subgroups.444
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